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Abstract
After capital punishment opponents’ pressure on drug suppliers reduced the lethal injection drug
supply, Oklahoma began using midazolam, resulting in botched executions. Condemned inmates
sought to stop use of this lethal injection protocol. In Glossip v. Gross, the U.S. Supreme Court
found inmates failed to establish such protocols entail a substantial risk of severe pain compared
to available alternatives, undermining the supply side attack strategy and leaving inmates facing
the possibility of an unnecessarily painful execution. This article places the Glossip decision
within the context of method of execution jurisprudence and discusses implications for the
ongoing battle over capital punishment.
Keywords: Eighth Amendment, cruel and unusual punishment, execution, capital
punishment, lethal injection
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How Would You Like to Die?: Glossip v. Gross Deals Blow to Abolitionists
While capital punishment has long been a contentious issue in America, the debate over
the death penalty has been reinvigorated recently due to concerns raised by several botched
executions during which the lethal injection protocol failed to produce a quick, painless,
sanitized execution (Goodwin, 2015). Although these incidents may have taken the public by
surprise, they were actually the culmination of a series of events in an ongoing behind-the-scenes
battle over capital punishment in America (Stern, 2015). When pressure from capital
punishment opponents prompted foreign governments to impose export restrictions and drug
manufacturers to refuse to sell to states seeking to use their drugs in executions, corrections
departments tasked with carrying out the death penalty faced a shortage of sodium thiopental, the
anesthetic long used as part of the lethal injection protocol (Dennis & Sun, 2014; Sack, 2015;
Sanburn, 2013). As a result states began experimenting with alternate drugs for their lethal
injection protocols, resulting in executions that did not go smoothly (Dennis & Sun, 2014; Sack,
2015; Sanburn, 2013).
Oklahoma’s first execution using midazolam as part of its lethal injection protocol
resulted in a disturbing spectacle during which Clayton Lockett remained conscious, writhed,
and experienced what appeared to be a painful, prolonged death (Stern, 2015). After this
botched execution, condemned Oklahoma inmates brought a civil rights lawsuit claiming
Oklahoma’s method of execution violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment and sought a preliminary injunction preventing the state from using this
lethal injection protocol (Glossip v. Gross, 2015; Stern, 2015). In Glossip v. Gross (2015), a
divided U.S. Supreme Court held that the condemned inmates were not entitled to a preliminary
injunction because the inmates did not establish that they were likely to succeed on the merits of
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their claim that this lethal injection protocol violated the Eight Amendment, given the inmates’
failure to prove that states had an available alternate execution method which would involve
substantially less risk of severe pain. The Glossip ruling thus deals a blow to the abolitionist
strategy of eliminating the lethal injection drug supply as a means to end executions and leaves
condemned inmates to lie in the bed abolitionists have made for them, facing an increased risk of
an unnecessarily painful execution because more effective anesthetics are no longer available to
the states (Fan, 2015). This article explicates the Court’s decision in Glossip v. Gross (2015),
places it within the context of recent developments in the administration of executions in the
United States and prior relevant death penalty case law, and discusses the implications of this
important decision for the ongoing battle over capital punishment in America.
Overview of U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment Capital Punishment Jurisprudence
Execution methods in the United States have included hangings, firing squads, the
electric chair, the gas chamber, and lethal injection (DiStanislao, 2015; Malik & Holdsworth,
2015). Changes in execution methods over time were ostensibly motivated by a search for more
humane methods, but may also have served other purposes such as changing the death penalty’s
image, making botched executions less visible to the public, reducing public pressure to abolish
capital punishment, and reducing public sympathy for the offender (Denno, 2007; Dieter, 2008).
Despite numerous challenges to the variety of execution methods, the U.S. Supreme Court has
never held that a challenged execution method violates the Eighth Amendment (Dieter, 2008;
DiStanislao, 2015).
Traditionally, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was
understood to prohibit punishment which involves torture or the infliction of gratuitous pain
(Nugent, 1993; Roy, 2002). This reflects a historic approach to interpreting the Eighth
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Amendment, viewing the cruel and unusual punishment clause as proscribing those punishments
which were deemed cruel and unusual by the standards prevailing at the time of the adoption of
the Bill of Rights (Harding, 1996; Nugent, 1993; Roy, 2002). Early challenges to execution
methods had little impact, as these challenges did not succeed and were generally resolved with
only minimal delays in executions (Dieter, 2008). The Court has upheld the use of firing squads
(Wilkerson v. Utah, 1878), the electric chair (In re Kemmler, 1890), and the repeated use of the
electric chair following a botched execution (Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 1947;
Nugent, 1993; Roy, 2002).
Weems v. United States (1910) and Trop v. Dulles (1958), cases in which the Court found
that noncapital punishments violated the Eighth Amendment due to the punishment being
disproportionate to the crime, signaled a shift away from a focus on whether the punishment
involved torture or excessive pain towards an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment which
takes account of current views of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment (Harding, 1996;
Nugent, 1993; Roy, 2002; Stinneford, 2011). Under this new approach, interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment is not restricted to a historic meaning bound by the problems which the
founding fathers sought to address (Roy, 2002; Weems v. United States, 1910). Instead, the
Eighth Amendment is interpreted in accordance with “evolving standards of decency” (Trop v.
Dulles, 1958, p. 101), which is largely ascertained by reference to prevailing practice in terms of
objective indicators such as state legislation (Stacy, 2005; Stinneford, 2011).
Weems v. United States (1910) and Trop v. Dulles (1958) are also significant for
recognizing that the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause goes beyond
addressing the acceptability of a method of punishment and actually guarantees proportionality
in sentence administration (Raeker-Jordan, 2011; Stacy, 2005). The Court has interpreted the
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Eighth Amendment’s proportionality requirement as prohibiting the application of the death
penalty to certain classes of offenders, including the mentally disabled (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002)
and juveniles (Roper v. Simmons, 2005), and certain types of offenses, including rape (Coker v.
Georgia, 1977; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 2008) and instances of felony murder in which the
defendant lacks a culpable mental state (Enmund v. Florida, 1982; Stacy, 2005; Stinneford,
2011).
In addition to the requirements of acceptability of the method of execution and
proportionality of the punishment to the crime and the offender’s culpability, the Eighth
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause requires that the death penalty not be
imposed arbitrarily (Furman v. Georgia, 1972; Smith, 2015). After the Court found in Furman
v. Georgia (1972) that current death penalty statutes violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment by leaving the decision to impose a sentence of death to the
jury’s unfettered, arbitrary discretion, executions were halted nationwide while states passed new
legislation and challenges to those laws worked their way through the courts (Fan, 2015; Malik
& Holdsworth, 2015; Smith, 2015). The Court struck down as unconstitutionally harsh death
penalty statutes which imposed a sentence of death for all capital crimes (Roberts v. Louisiana,
1976; Woodson v. North Carolina, 1976) and upheld as constitutional death penalty statutes
which established guidelines for juries’ decisions regarding whether to sentence a defendant to
death (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976; Malik & Holdsworth, 2015; Radin, 1978).
Lethal Injection Adoption, Challenges, and Baze v. Rees (2008)
As executions resumed in the wake of Gregg v. Georgia (1976), states began shifting to a
new execution method, lethal injection (Malik & Holdsworth, 2015). This change in execution
method represents a medicalization of capital punishment which allows executions to appear

GLOSSIP V. GROSS DEALS BLOW TO ABOLITIONISTS

7

more humane and makes them less visually disturbing for those viewing the execution (Denno,
2007; Yehuda, 2013). In 1977, Oklahoma was the first state to enact a law authorizing lethal
injection as a method of execution, adopting a three-drug protocol hastily devised by a state
medical examiner who admittedly lacked expertise in this area (Blythe, 2015; Denno, 2007,
2014). Other states promptly began adopting lethal injection, with many of them copying
Oklahoma’s three-drug protocol despite the lack of medical studies supporting it (Blythe, 2015;
Denno, 2007, 2014). Despite the rapid spread of lethal injection execution methods, some states
continued to use older methods of execution (Dieter, 2008). Several challenges to these older
methods of execution, while not resulting in the U. S. Supreme Court issuing a ruling on their
constitutionality, nevertheless prompted state legislatures to preemptively pass legislation
adopting lethal injection as an execution method (Dieter, 2008).
The widely used three-drug lethal injection protocol, first adopted by Oklahoma and
copied by other states, consists of an anesthetic used to induce unconsciousness, a paralytic agent
which stops respiration, and potassium chloride which causes cardiac arrest (Berger, 2015;
Denno, 2007, 2014; Fan, 2015). The three-drug lethal injection protocol has been subject to
numerous legal challenges, with a primary concern being that if the anesthetic is not effective,
the paralytic agent will mask (but not prevent) the condemned inmate’s suffering as the inmate
suffocates and endures the burning pain caused by potassium chloride working its way through
the inmate’s veins (Berger, 2015; Denno, 2007, 2014; Fan, 2015). There are many reasons for
concern that the anesthetic used in the three-drug lethal injection protocol may be ineffective,
including the particular drug used, the lack of medical training for the personnel administering
IV lines or determining level of unconsciousness, the lack of clear procedures, and potential
problems with drug quality due to use of unregulated drug sources (Berger, 2015).
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After numerous challenges to the widely used three-drug lethal injection protocol yielded
a split in the Courts of Appeal, in 2008 the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of Eighth
Amendment challenges to this execution method (Denno, 2014). In Baze v. Rees (2008),
condemned inmates challenged Kentucky’s three-drug lethal injection protocol based on a claim
that it violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The
inmates contended that while the anesthetic used in the protocol could render one unable to
experience pain if administered correctly, the protocol involved a risk of significant pain when
the paralytic agent and cardiac arrest inducing drug are administered if the anesthetic was
improperly administered. They argued that the state could instead use less risky procedures such
as a single-drug anesthetic-only lethal injection protocol, use of more qualified personnel for
carrying out the lethal injection protocol, and use of medical equipment to assess
unconsciousness. In Baze, the Court held that Kentucky’s three-drug lethal injection protocol, a
protocol widely used by other states, did not violate the Eighth Amendment because the
condemned inmates failed to prove that their proffered alternative execution procedures
significantly reduced a substantial risk of severe pain. In the plurality opinion, the Court
reasoned that the Eighth Amendment does not require the avoidance of all risk of pain, which is
inevitably associated with any execution method, and declined to adopt an “unnecessary risk”
standard, which would involve courts in endless litigation over claims that states are violating the
Eighth Amendment by refusing to adopt marginally better alternative execution methods (Baze v.
Rees, 2008).
Baze v. Rees (2008), far from putting an end to Eighth Amendment challenges to lethal
injection, served as a roadmap for such litigation, which proliferated following Baze, prompting
some states to switch to one-drug lethal injection protocols, consisting solely of a large dose of
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an anesthetic, in an effort to avoid further litigation (Denno, 2014; DiStanislao, 2015). The
lower courts became embroiled in deciding whether the various challenged lethal injection
protocols were similar enough to Kentucky’s protocol to be upheld as constitutional pursuant to
Baze, as well as passing upon the constitutionality of other variants on lethal injection protocols
(Grace, 2009; Yehuda, 2013). While adhering to a protocol similar to the one upheld in Baze
may have had the lure of potentially being a safe harbor in the litigation storm, states were soon
forced to abandon the traditional three-drug lethal injection protocol and begin experimenting
with the use of other drugs due to capital punishment opponents’ successful campaign to cause
drug shortages (“Europe’s moral stand,” 2014; Fan, 2015; Stern, 2015). This change in lethal
injection protocols in turn prompted new litigation challenging the use of untested drugs as
posing a risk of pain which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment (Denno, 2014; DiStanislao,
2015; Smith, 2015).
Post-Baze Lethal Injection Drug Shortages and Experimentation
In recent years, states have encountered shortages of the drugs traditionally used to
induce unconsciousness as part of lethal injection protocols, largely due to a combination of
Europe’s strong stance against capital punishment, the response of both foreign governments and
pharmaceutical companies to pressure from opponents of capital punishment, and the desire of
health care companies to dissociate themselves from executions (“Europe’s moral stand,” 2014;
Fan, 2015; Stern, 2015). While the European Union’s 2005 ban on exports of goods for use in
capital punishment or torture was the origin of the chain of events which led to the drug shortage
crisis, the drug shortage was acutely felt when the sole domestic producer of sodium thiopental
ceased production in 2010 due to a domestic plant contamination issue and was unable to shift
production to its plant in Italy due to liability concerns associated with the Italian government’s
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demand that the pharmaceutical company assure its drugs would not be used in executions
(“Europe’s moral stand,” 2014).
In response to the drug shortage, states began procuring sodium thiopental from alternate
sources abroad (“Europe’s moral stand,” 2014; Fan, 2015). However, each time the states found
a source it was quickly cut off by a human rights non-governmental organization prompting
England and the European Union to tighten export restrictions and foreign pharmaceutical
companies refusing to sell once they found out the drugs were being used for executions (Stern,
2015). Compounding the states’ drug shortage problem, the sodium thiopental which states had
managed to obtain from foreign sources before those avenues were cut off were seized by the
Drug Enforcement Administration because they were illegally imported from suppliers not
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (Stern, 2015).
When states began using pentobarbital for executions due to difficulty in obtaining
sodium thiopental, the Denmark-based pharmaceutical company which made the drug in the
United States instituted distribution controls which prevented the sale of pentobarbital to prisons
in the United States in response to shareholder pressure and unfavorable media coverage
prompted by a human rights non-governmental organization drawing media attention to the issue
(“Europe’s moral stand,” 2014; Fan, 2015; Stern, 2015). With this source of pentobarbital no
longer available, Oklahoma bought pentobarbital from compounding pharmacies (Stern, 2015).
When compounding pharmacies began refusing to sell pentobarbital for use in executions due to
public pressure, Oklahoma began using midazolam, a readily-available drug made by many drug
companies in the United States, borrowing the idea from Florida and Ohio, which had recently
used the drug in executions (Stern, 2015). After botched executions using midazolam occurred
in Oklahoma and Arizona, condemned Oklahoma inmates sought review of Oklahoma’s lethal
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injection protocol in a civil rights lawsuit which would become known as Glossip v. Gross
(Stern, 2015).
Glossip v. Gross
Facts of Glossip v. Gross
For years, Oklahoma used the lethal injection protocol which was upheld by the Court in
Baze v. Rees (2008). However, Oklahoma was unable to obtain the barbiturate sodium
thiopental, the first drug in the lethal injection protocol, when, in response to pressure from death
penalty opponents and foreign governments, drug manufacturers refused to sell to parties
intending to use their drugs in executions. Oklahoma changed the first drug in the protocol to the
barbiturate pentobarbital, but soon the state was also unable to obtain pentobarbital due to drug
manufacturers’ refusal to sell. Oklahoma then changed the first drug in the protocol to the
sedative midazolam, a benzodiazepine.
Oklahoma’s first execution using midazolam was botched, as the midazolam failed to
keep inmate Clayton Lockett unconscious when the second and third drugs were administered.
This resulted in a disturbing spectacle during which the inmate writhed, complained that the
drugs were not working, and finally died 40 minutes after the first drug was administered.
Following an investigation which faulted the IV line’s failure to completely deliver the drugs
into the inmate’s veins, Oklahoma made changes to its lethal injection protocol aimed at
ensuring proper IV insertion and increasing the midazolam dose from 100 to 500 mg.
Condemned Oklahoma inmates filed a §1983 civil rights action claiming Oklahoma’s
current execution method violated the Eighth Amendment. They argued that this execution
method created an unacceptable risk of severe pain due to the ineffectiveness of midazolam in
preventing pain when the subsequent drugs, a paralytic agent and potassium chloride, were
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administered. Four inmates with fast-approaching execution dates filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction prohibiting Oklahoma from using its current lethal injection protocol.
Following a hearing, the district court denied the inmates’ application for a preliminary
injunction because the inmates did not prove midazolam was ineffective in preventing pain. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary
injunction. Charles Warner, one of the inmates who sought the preliminary injunction, was
executed after the Court denied the inmates’ application to stay the executions and prior to the
Court’s grant of certiorari and concomitant stay of the remaining inmates’ executions at the
state’s request.
A Court Divided: Overview of Opinions in Glossip v. Gross
A unique feature of Glossip v. Gross is the fact that four justices read their opinions from
the bench, evidencing a passionately divided Court (Goldfarb, 2015). The decision in Glossip v.
Gross was a 5-4 split, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and
Kennedy in the majority and Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Breyer dissenting. In
the majority opinion, written by Justice Alito, the Court clarified that an inmate challenging a
method of execution as violating the Eight Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment must prove that the challenged execution method involves a substantial risk of
severe pain in comparison to other known, available execution methods. The principal dissent,
written by Justice Sotomayor, criticized the Court for changing an absolute prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment into a prohibition which depends on the availability of other less cruel
methods for inflicting that punishment. These two opinions squarely address the heart of the
claims raised in this case and the majority opinion sets an important precedent which will make
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future Eighth Amendment method of execution claims extremely difficult for condemned
inmates to win.
Quite aside from the 5-4 split represented by the majority opinion and the principal
dissent, there was also a battle of ideas concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty
itself. In addition to the principal dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, authored
another dissent arguing the Court should revisit the constitutionality of the death penalty
altogether, regardless of the method used to inflict it. Justice Breyer’s dissent elicited scathing
responses in the form of two concurrences, authored by Justices Scalia and Thomas, each of
whom joined in the other’s concurrence, rebuffing this idea as a retread of old abolitionist
refrains long since cast aside. While this heated exchange is tangential to the case outcome, it
may generate renewed debate about the death penalty’s constitutionality and is indicative of the
positions Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Thomas will take on future capital punishment cases
which come before the Court.
Majority Opinion Analysis in Glossip v. Gross
Justice Alito delivered the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy joined. The Court held that the condemned inmates were not
entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting Oklahoma from executing them using its current
lethal injection protocol because the inmates did not establish that they were likely to succeed on
the merits of their claim that this execution method violates the Eight Amendment. In order to
succeed on a claim that a method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment, one must prove
(a) that the execution method entails a demonstrated risk of severe pain; and (b) that it is a
substantial risk in comparison to known, available alternative execution methods. The inmates
failed as to both items. The Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s ruling upholding the district
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court’s denial of a preliminary injunction based on two independent grounds. First, the inmates
did not identify another known, available execution method which involves a lower risk of pain,
as required for claims that an execution method violates the Eighth Amendment in accordance
with the controlling precedent, Baze v. Rees (2008). Second, the district court did not commit
clear error in finding that the inmates did not prove that the use of a heavy dose of midazolam in
Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol involves a substantial risk of severe pain.
Justice Alito noted that although execution methods in the United States have evolved
over time as states have sought to adopt methods thought more humane by that era’s standards,
the Court has never ruled an execution method violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment. The Court has upheld as constitutional death by firing squad,
electric chair, and the previously widely-used three-drug lethal injection protocol. Justice Alito
explained that the Court’s decisions upholding various execution methods as constitutional have
been based in part on the recognition that there must be some constitutional method of
implementing the death penalty since it has been established that the death penalty is
constitutional. Thus, since any execution method necessarily involves some risk of pain, the
Eighth Amendment cannot require avoiding all risk of pain.
The first reason for the Court’s ruling is that the inmates did not prove that using
midazolam as part of the lethal injection protocol entails a substantial risk of harm in comparison
to other known, available execution methods. The Court rejected the inmates’ suggestion that
the state could use sodium thiopental or pentobarbital because the district court did not commit
clear error in finding those drugs unavailable to the state of Oklahoma. Oklahoma has not been
able to obtain sodium thiopental or pentobarbital and the inmates have failed to identify any
available drugs that the state could use in lieu of those now unavailable drugs. The Court
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rejected the inmates’ argument that they should not be required to identify an acceptable
alternative execution method, noting that the controlling precedent, Baze v. Rees (2008), requires
an inmate claiming that an execution method violates the Eighth Amendment to plead and prove
another known, available execution method involving substantially less risk of severe pain than
the challenged execution method.
The second reason for the Court’s ruling is that the district court did not commit clear
error in finding that the use of a 500-mg dose of midazolam as part of the lethal injection
protocol is highly likely to produce an inability to experience pain from the subsequent
administration of the other two drugs which are part of Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol.
The state’s expert gave credible testimony that it was nearly certain that a 500-mg dose of
midazolam would render a person sufficiently unconscious so as to not experience pain from the
paralytic agent and potassium chloride. In an Eighth Amendment execution method challenge,
the inmates bringing the challenge bear the burden of proving the challenged execution method
creates a substantial risk of severe pain. The inmates failed to meet this burden of proof, as the
inmates’ experts admitted that they had no scientific proof contradicting the testimony of the
state’s expert since there were no scientific studies on the ability of midazolam to prevent a
person from experiencing the pain involved with the administration of the second and third
drugs. The fact that the use of a small, therapeutic dose of midazolam as the only anesthesia
during surgery does not meet the medical standard of care is irrelevant to the issue of whether the
much larger dose of midazolam used in Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol is sufficient to meet
Eighth Amendment standards for implementing a death sentence. The Court rejected the
inmates’ argument that midazolam’s ceiling effect, or lack of increase in effectiveness as the
dosage is increased above a certain level, compromises the district court’s finding of the 500-mg
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midazolam dose’s efficacy in preventing pain. Because the inmates’ experts offered only
speculation regarding at what dose a ceiling effect occurs, the inmates failed to establish that the
district court’s finding was clearly erroneous.
Principal Dissenting Opinion Analysis in Glossip v. Gross
Justice Sotomayor authored the principal dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg,
Kagan, and Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor leveled two criticisms at the Court’s decision.
First, Justice Sotomayor criticized the Court for deferring to the lower court’s decision to believe
the testimony of the state’s sole expert witness, which was illogical, not scientifically supported,
and in conflict with the testimony of the inmates’ two expert witnesses. Second, Justice
Sotomayor criticized the Court’s imposition of a new requirement that inmates claiming a
method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment must prove that alternative methods of
executing them are available to the state.
With regard to the first criticism, Justice Sotomayor faulted the Court for not finding the
district court committed clear error in finding that the inmates failed to show that they were
likely to prove the state’s current lethal injection protocol poses a risk of pain which violates the
Constitution. The district court’s finding that 500 mg of midazolam can keep someone
unconscious when the very painful paralysis-inducing and cardiac arrest-inducing drugs are
subsequently administered was based on the state’s sole expert witness’ testimony, which the
district court should not have believed because it was not supported by scientific studies.
Furthermore, the inmates proved that the state’s lethal injection protocol poses an objectively
intolerable risk of severe pain through the testimony of the inmates’ two expert witnesses, who
stated that there is no dose of midazolam which can maintain unconsciousness when painful
stimuli occur and thus the drug is not approved for use as a sole anesthetic during surgery.
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Justice Sotomayor also faulted the Court for creating a new requirement that inmates
must identify a known, available execution method posing substantially less risk of pain in order
to prevail on a challenge to a state’s execution method as constituting cruel and unusual
punishment. Not only does the Court cite the Baze v. Rees (2008) plurality opinion as the basis
for imposing the requirement even though this position was not taken by a majority of the
members of the Baze court, the Court also takes the Baze plurality opinion’s requirement out of
its specific context and now imposes it on all execution method challenges. In Baze, the plurality
opinion stated that when an inmate challenges a state’s method of execution based on claims that
the current execution method has a higher risk of pain than other procedures which the state
could adopt, the inmate must prove that the current execution method poses a demonstrated risk
of severe pain and it is a substantial risk in comparison to other known, available execution
methods. However, the Baze plurality opinion did not state that any Eighth Amendment
execution method challenge requires an analysis of comparative risk.
Justice Sotomayor accused the Court of imposing a new rule which would allow the
state to use barbaric, torturous execution methods, such as burning the condemned inmate alive,
if an inmate challenging such execution methods fails to identify another known, available
execution method which poses substantially less risk of pain. However, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, not just punishments which are cruel and unusual in
comparison to other available execution methods, and if the only available execution method is
cruel and unusual, then the state cannot constitutionally implement a death sentence. Rather than
punishing inmates for drug shortages they did not cause by imposing additional requirements on
their Eighth Amendment challenges to execution methods, the Court should be reviewing
execution methods more closely since states are adapting to drug shortages by experimenting on
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inmates with hastily adopted new protocols involving untested drugs, thus increasing the chances
that execution methods will result in a substantial risk of severe pain.
Dissent Relating to Per Se Constitutionality in Glossip v. Gross
Justice Breyer authored an additional dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, in
which he urged the Court to request briefing on the issue of the constitutionality of capital
punishment and recounted the reasons he believes it is very likely capital punishment violates the
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Breyer said it is time to
reevaluate the death penalty’s constitutionality according to current societal standards because
during the nearly four decades which have passed since Gregg v. Georgia (1976), it has become
evident that the procedures developed by the states cannot guarantee the reliable, non-arbitrary
application of capital punishment, as evidenced by empirical studies and experience. Justice
Breyer opined that capital punishment is both cruel, due to its unreliability and arbitrariness
along with excessive delays which undermine the death penalty’s purpose, and unusual, as
relatively few states now actually execute inmates.
Justice Breyer cited as evidence of capital punishment’s unreliability the exoneration of
wrongfully convicted death row inmates and researchers’ discovery of compelling evidence of
incidents of the execution of innocent persons, some of whom have been posthumously
pardoned. Justice Breyer noted that it is troubling that those convicted of capital offenses are far
more likely to be exonerated than those convicted of other crimes. He observed that this may
indicate a greater likelihood of wrongful conviction owing in part to public pressure to obtain
convictions for gruesome crimes, errors in forensic evidence analysis, and the use of deathqualified jurors, which research shows results in a jury biased towards conviction.
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Justice Breyer cited as evidence of capital punishment’s arbitrariness the many empirical
studies which have found that relevant factors such as egregiousness of the crime do not
influence who receives the death penalty while irrelevant factors, such as the victim’s race, the
defendant’s or victim’s gender, and geographical location, do influence who receives the death
penalty. Both these empirical studies’ findings and Justice Breyer’s own experience on the
bench observing irrational discrepancies in who receives the death penalty, with some receiving
the death penalty while others who committed far more egregious crimes do not, demonstrate
that capital punishment is imposed in a capricious, arbitrary manner rather than being reserved
for the worst offenders.
Justice Breyer opined that the excessive delay in executing condemned inmates both
aggravates the cruelty of capital punishment and so undermines its purported purposes of
deterrence and retribution that it renders capital punishment the infliction of pain without any
legitimate purpose, thus making the death penalty unconstitutional. Excessive delays in
execution constitute cruelty because death row inmates are typically held in solitary
confinement, which is harmful to mental health, and the dehumanizing effects of such conditions
are amplified by the uncertainty under which the condemned inmates must live with regard to
whether and when they will actually be executed. Furthermore, excessive delays, combined with
the rarity of an inmate actually being executed, undermine capital punishment’s ability to deter
or satisfy the community’s desire for retribution. Such delays are inevitable given the need to
ensure reliability and fairness in cases which have such high stakes. Justice Breyer stated that
our inability to have both a death penalty which serves a legitimate purpose and a system which
seeks to ensure fairness and reliability in the application of capital punishment is strong evidence
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that capital punishment violates the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment.
Finally, Justice Breyer argued that the rarity of death sentences in the United States
makes capital punishment an unusual punishment, thus contravening the Eighth Amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Breyer cited the rapid decline in both the
number of people sentenced to death and the number of people actually executed in the United
States for the past 15 years, the fact that 60% of the states either have abolished the death penalty
or have not executed anyone for the past 8 years, three states’ disproportionate contribution of
80% of the executions occurring in the United States during 2014, and the geographic
concentration of executions in relatively few counties as evidence that capital punishment is now
unusual. For all of these reasons, Justice Breyer concludes that it is very likely capital
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and
urges the Court to request briefing on the issue of whether capital punishment is unconstitutional
per se.
Concurrences Relating to Per Se Constitutionality in Glossip v. Gross
Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, in which he
responded to Justice Breyer’s call for the Court to abolish capital punishment. Justice Scalia
noted that the Court has never declared that the death penalty is unconstitutional, ostensibly
because the text of the Constitution specifically references capital crimes. Justice Scalia
criticized Justice Breyer for attempting to change the meanings of the Eight Amendment terms
cruel and unusual, and for advancing a meaningless, contradictory argument.
Justice Scalia attacked Justice Breyer’s argument that the death penalty is cruel because it
is unreliable as nonsense, noting that it is not the punishment that is unreliable, but the
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convictions. Justice Scalia contended that changing the punishment for terrible crimes will not
reduce public pressure to convict, which emanates from the crime’s terrible nature rather than
from the potential punishment, and that an innocent defendant actually has better chances on
appeal when sentenced to death rather than life due to receiving help from the abolitionists in the
form of an unlimited supply of legal representation and judicial favoritism.
Justice Scalia refuted Justice Breyer’s argument that the death penalty is cruel because it
is arbitrary, noting that the study on which Justice Breyer relies presumptuously attempts to
measure the egregiousness of crimes when these are moral judgments which must be made in
context by juries alongside consideration of all the considerations relevant to punishment.
Variation in juries’ judgments from one case to another is inherent in the use of juries and the
fact that some juries do not impose the greatest authorized punishment does not make capital
punishment cruel.
Finally, in response to Justice Breyer’s argument that the death penalty is cruel because
of the lengthy delays involved, Justice Scalia observed that life without parole is no shorter a
period of confinement and that objections to the conditions of solitary confinement can be
ameliorated by altering conditions of confinement rather than resorting to abolition. Justice
Breyer’s contention that delays deprive the death penalty of serving any legitimate purpose
neglects to take into account the incapacitation purpose served by the death penalty, as evidenced
by the fact that one of the inmates in the present case committed murder while in prison, and
rests on Justice Breyer’s assessment that a life sentence is retributive enough when such
assessments are not within the judiciary’s purview. Regarding Justice Breyer’s conjecture that it
is unlikely capital punishment has a significant deterrent effect, Justice Scalia noted that a
number of studies find a deterrent effect and accused Justice Breyer of being insensitive to the
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needs of those who live in neighborhoods plagued by violence by seeking to override the
citizens’ determination of the value of the incremental deterrence provided by the death penalty.
Justice Scalia accused Justice Breyer, in arguing that associated delays make the death
penalty cruel and thus require abolition, of taking advantage of delays which the Court created,
with Justice Breyer leading the way down this ill-advised path, by producing a complicated maze
of restrictions on the death penalty which conform to society’s evolving standards of decency as
ascertained by the Court in its post-Trop v. Dulles (1958) jurisprudence. Justice Scalia noted
also that Justice Breyer relies on the trend of states forsaking use of the death penalty in his
assessment that the death penalty has become an unusual punishment when this trend has been
prompted by the costs created by this line of jurisprudence. If the Court were to revisit the
constitutionality of capital punishment as Justice Breyer urged, Justice Scalia would call for
briefing of whether Trop and its progeny should be overruled, as Trop has damaged federalism,
rests on the faulty assumption that the Court is well equipped to ascertain societal standards of
decency, and emboldens a minority of the justices to attempt to impose their own standards of
decency on citizens who have repeatedly voted in favor of capital punishment.
Justice Thomas also authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, in which he
responded to Justice Breyer’s claim that the death penalty is not being reserved for the most
egregious offenses. Justice Thomas criticized Justice Breyer’s reliance on abolitionist studies,
which find that death sentences are not correlated with the crimes’ egregiousness and are
correlated with geographic location of the crime, as evidencing disrespect for the Constitution’s
mandate that a jury of the defendant’s peers is responsible for making the decision of whether to
impose the death penalty. The study on which Justice Breyer mainly relied was based on law
students’ moral judgments of level of egregiousness of hypothetical murders based on written
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synopses, but the Constitution places such moral judgments in the hands of jurors from the local
community who have observed a full trial, not elites who sit in law school and read hypothetical
factual scenarios. Furthermore, it is unsurprising that the study finds that geographic location of
the crime explains the imposition of death sentences better than law students’ egregiousness
scores do, as the Constitution’s placement of punishment decisions in the hands of local juries
appears to intentionally introduce geographic location as a factor in sentencing, leaving moral
judgments regarding punishment in the hands of the defendants’ local peers. Thus, the
correlation between the geographic location in which the crime was committed and death
sentences cannot be considered an indicator of arbitrariness.
Regardless, Justice Thomas asserts the study’s findings are unreliable, and thus constitute
an unsuitable basis for declaring capital punishment unconstitutional, because this study relies on
a series of moral judgments in which depravity is arbitrarily quantified by assigning points
reflecting how much a victim’s life is worth based on stereotypical assessments. After
expressing outrage over the cold mathematical calculation of which victims lives are worth more
than others, Justice Thomas proceeded to recount the gruesome details of numerous capital cases
which demonstrate that there is not a problem of capital cases being insufficiently egregious to
justify capital punishment. Justice Thomas then argued that the Court has been attempting to
undemocratically abolish the death penalty by creating a series of unfounded Eighth Amendment
claims in a line of cases which have exempted the mentally challenged, juveniles, and rapists
from capital punishment, allowing the perpetrators of some of the most egregious crimes to
escape the death sentences imposed by juries. Justice Thomas opined that if Justice Breyer is
uncomfortable with disparate outcomes, the Court should stop inventing Eighth Amendment
claims which allow some capital defendants to escape the jury’s moral judgment that their crimes
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are so egregious that they warrant the ultimate penalty while others are not granted such a
reprieve.
Implications
An immediate implication of the Court’s decision in Glossip is that states can use the
specific lethal injection protocol upheld in this case, which includes reliance on midazolam alone
to induce unconsciousness, with assurance that it does not violate the Eighth Amendment. States
which had been holding off on conducting executions due to drug shortages combined with
uncertainty about litigation risks inherent in substituting midazolam in their lethal injection
protocols have already resumed conducting executions (Berman, 2017; Goldberg, 2015).
Just as Baze failed to put an end to the litigation challenging lethal injection (Denno,
2014), Glossip likely has not put the issue to rest once and for all, as any lethal injection protocol
which varies from the one upheld in Glossip will still be subject to challenge. Some states may
try to adhere strictly to the lethal injection protocol upheld in Glossip in order to avoid further
litigation. However, just as the strategy of adhering to the lethal injection protocol upheld in
Baze became unfeasible due to drug shortages (Denno, 2014), over time states may encounter
practical obstacles to continued use of the Glossip-approved lethal injection protocol which
necessitate variation.
Since states are continuing to face shortages of the drugs traditionally used in lethal
injection protocols, the Court’s decision in Glossip will likely embolden states to engage in more
widespread experimentation with changing lethal injection protocols to include the use of drugs
not traditionally or widely used in lethal injection protocols and off-label use of drugs (use of
drugs for purposes for which they have not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration;
Goldberg, 2015). Such experimentation may well result in more botched executions, which have
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the potential to sway public opinion in favor of abolition (Goldberg, 2015). This
experimentation is also likely to spawn continued litigation challenging states’ lethal injection
procedures. In fact, in the wake of the Glossip ruling, an attorney who represented one of the
inmates in that case vowed continued legal action challenging states’ lethal injection methods
(Berman, 2015).
The Court’s decision in Glossip will make it more difficult for condemned inmates
bringing Eighth Amendment method of execution claims to prevail. The Court has now made it
abundantly clear that the inmates must prove that states have an available alternative execution
method which involves substantially less risk of severe pain. Even if condemned inmates
challenging another lethal injection protocol prove it involves a demonstrated risk of severe pain,
the drug shortages faced by the states, ironically largely due to pressure from death penalty
opponents (“Europe’s moral stand,” 2014; Fan, 2015), may make it difficult for the inmates to
prove the state has an available alternative execution method which would present substantially
less risk.
Unfortunately, the success of capital punishment opponents’ campaign to dry up the
supply of anesthetics previously commonly used in lethal injection protocols has resulted in
states experimenting with lethal injection protocols which use drugs of more questionable value
in preventing condemned inmates from experiencing pain (DiStanislao, 2015; “Europe’s moral
stand,” 2014; Fan, 2015). The Court’s holding in Glossip undermines the value of this strategy
of trying to end executions by making lethal injection drugs unobtainable. However, given
Europe’s strong stance against facilitating capital punishment as well as the public relations and
ethical issues which drive pharmaceutical companies’ aversion to having their drugs associated
with executions (“Europe’s moral stand,” 2014), it is unlikely that the trend of increasing scarcity
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of effective anesthetics will be reversed. By requiring condemned inmates challenging an
execution method as cruel and unusual to prove there is an available alternative execution
method which involves substantially less risk of severe pain, the Court leaves condemned
inmates to lie in the bed abolitionists have made for them. The abolitionist strategy of
undermining the supply of lethal injection drugs, combined with the Court’s decision in Glossip,
increases condemned inmates’ risk of an unnecessarily painful execution (Fan, 2015).
Finally, Justice Breyer’s dissent is likely to renew debate about the constitutionality of
the death penalty itself. This debate may raise consciousness about the problems associated with
capital punishment, which may in turn increase the ranks of death penalty opponents or at least
further sway the opinion of those who have supported the death penalty but have begun to have
misgivings about it due to public awareness of wrongful convictions and botched executions.
While Justice Breyer’s dissent likely will be heartening to death penalty opponents, it is unlikely
that the Court will declare capital punishment unconstitutional per se absent a change in the
Court’s composition, as only two justices endorsed this position. However, it is quite likely that
the Court will continue to be active in deciding issues surrounding challenges to various aspects
of capital punishment and the ideological divide between Justices Breyer and Ginsburg and
Justice Thomas is likely to continue to shape the coalitions and discourse on the Court’s capital
punishment cases.
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